Notifiable incident

Incident ID	5668
Duty holder:	INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd
Facility/Activity:	Ichthys Venturer
Facility type:	Floating production storage and offloading facility

Incident details	
Division	Occupational Health and Safety
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	03/11/2018 06:30 AM (WST)
Notification date	03/11/2018 06:31 AM (WST)
NOPSEMA response date	03/11/2018 08:21 AM (WST)
Received by	[redacted]
Nearest state	WA
Initial category type *(based on notification)*	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category *(based on notification)*	Damage to safety-critical equipment
3 Day report received	05/11/2018
Final report received	30/11/2018
All required data received	
Final category type *(based on final report)*	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category *(based on final report)*	Damage to safety-critical equipment
Brief description	OHS-DSCE-Fire Water Foam Skids - Failure to meet performance standard
Location	Process deck
Subtype/s	Facility integrity
Summary *(at notification)*	Operator advised that during 6 monthly function testing of fire water foam skids, solenoids and actuators failed to operate remotely from the CCR as per design on 8 out of 30 skids. This was a breach of performance standard F6.5 (Active Fire Protection Standard). All skids have since been returned to service.
Details *(from final report)*	Operator advised that during 6 monthly function testing of fire water foam skids, solenoids and actuators failed to operate remotely from the CCR as per design on 8 out of 30 skids. This was a breach of performance standard F6.5 (Active Fire Protection Standard). All skids have since been returned to service. During routine maintenance (function testing) of the Firewater Foam Skids, solenoid and actuator failures occurred on 8 out of 30 foam skids which would have resulted in foam activation not being able to be activated from the Central Control Room (CCR). Therefore S060-AH-PST-10043 Active Fire Protection – FPSO Performance Standard was not met - section F.6.5 - Foam valves and associated components shall be functional.
Immediate cause/s	Solenoid failure / Actuator failure (sticking)
Root cause/s	
Root cause description	The casual factors identified to date include: 1. Trunnion ball valve with instrument air actuating system not suitable for quick release application. 2. Contamination/corrosion in both actuating air line and foam line.

Duty inspector recommendation	
Date	05/11/2018
Duty inspector	[redacted]
Recommendation	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Major investigation decision	
Date	05/11/2018
Decision	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Non-major investigation review and recommendation	
Date	
Inspector	
Risk gap	Moderate
Type of standard	Established
Initial strategy	Investigate

Recommended follow up strategy	
Recommended strategy	Investigate
Supporting considerations	Consequence - serious, failure of an MAE control. Benchmark likelihood - remote. Potential likelihood increases to possible, due to loss of remote control of the deluges. Established standard - as per SoV. Relevant incidents - deluge solenoid failures - RMS 5586, 5591, 5598, 5630

Non-major investigation decision	
Date	06/11/2018
RoN	[redacted]
RoN review result	Agree with recommendation
Strategy decision	Investigate
Supporting considerations	

Associated inspection	
Inspection ID	1794